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THE JUDICIARY SAYS, YOU CAN'T HAVE
IT BOTH WAYS: JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL-
A DOCTRINE PRECLUDING
INCONSISTENT POSITIONS
A party cannot occupy inconsistent positions; and where
one has an election between several inconsistent courses of
action, he will be confined to that which he first adopts.
-Melville M. Bigelow, 18721
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose X is injured in an industrial accident and sues Y for
negligence based on an agency theory that Y is X's employer. At
trial X successfully proves that Y is indeed the employer and re-
covers a judgment against Y. Now, suppose that X wants to sue Z,
Y's insurance carrier, but Z has a provision that employees may
not directly sue the insurance company.2 Should X now be allowed
to assert that X is not an employee of Y so X may recover against
Z?
Suppose that in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding a debtor
fails to list a pending personal injury lawsuit against a third party.
All debts have been discharged, and the debtor has sworn there
are no more assets. Thus, it seems that the debtor has implicitly
asserted that there is no pending personal injury lawsuit. Should
the debtor now be allowed to proceed with this pending personal
injury suit? Is it fair for debtors to use the court system to dis-
charge their debts and then benefit from the lawsuit to the exclu-
sion of their creditors? If the personal injury suit is not allowed to
proceed, should the previous tortfeasor be allowed to escape the
consequences of the previous tortious acts?
These questions lie at the heart of the doctrine of judicial es-
toppel, a doctrine that when invoked, precludes a party from
1. MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL 578 (1872).
2. The above hypothetical is almost identical to the facts of Allen v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 667 F.2d 1162 (4th Cir. 1982).
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making inconsistent statements3 to a court in a subsequent judicial
proceeding.4 Although it is an obscure legal doctrine, judicial es-
toppel, like other forms of estoppel, has important strategic value
at trial and shame on the poor lawyer who has a case dismissed sua
sponte by a court on a grounds that the lawyer has never even
heard of. Judicial estoppel also serves important and unique social
policies within our judicial system. Policy considerations range
from "uphold[ing] ... the sanctity of the oath"''" to "prevent[ing]
parties from making a mockery of justice by inconsistent plead-
ings."' The doctrine also protects the integrity of the courts and
the judicial process.
Not only is judicial estoppel a "sleeper" doctrine, rarely used
by the courts,' it is also somewhat controversial. Courts that apply
judicial estoppel have interpreted its policies and elements vari-
ously,9 while other courts have rejected the doctrine outright.'0
This Comment asserts that the doctrine of judicial estoppel
3. For the purposes of this Comment, the term "statement" will refer to sworn
testimony and positions asserted, although not necessarily under oath, which have
been accepted by a court as true.
4. Rand G. Boyers, Comment, Precluding Inconsistent Statements: The Doctrine
of Judicial Estoppel, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1244, 1244 (1986); Douglas W. Henkin,
Comment, Judicial Estoppel-Beating Shields into Swords and Back Again, 139 U. PA.
L. REv. 1711, 1711 (1991); Mark J. Plumer, Note, Judicial Estoppel: The Refurbishing
of a Judicial Shield, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 409,411 (1987).
5. Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Melton v.
Anderson, 222 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).
6. American Nat'l Bank v. F.D.I.C., 710 F.2d 1528, 1536 (11th Cir. 1983).
7. Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595,598 (6th Cir. 1982).
8. Indeed, judicial estoppel is such a rare doctrine that the U.S. Supreme Court
has only mentioned the doctrine once in passing in its entire history. See Huffman v.
Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 606 n.18 (1975):
We in no way intend to suggest that there is a right of access to a federal fo-
rum for the disposition of all federal issues, or that the normal rules of res
judicata and judicial estoppel do not operate to bar relitigation in actions
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of federal issues arising in state court proceedings.
9. Compare Allen, 667 F.2d at 1166 ("'[J]udicial estoppel' is invoked in these
circumstances to prevent the party from 'playing fast and loose' with the courts...
.") with Konstantinidis, 626 F.2d at 937 ("[J]udicial estoppel focuses on the integrity
of the judicial process.") and Scarano v. Central R.R., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir.
1953) ("[I]ntentional self-contradiction is being used as a means of obtaining unfair
advantage in a forum provided for suitors seeking justice.").
10. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. County Chrysler Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1520 n.10 (10th
Cir. 1991) ("mT1his court does not recognize the doctrine of judicial estoppel."); See
Konstantinidis, 626 F.2d at 938; Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 437-38
(10th Cir. 1956) (noting that judicial estoppel "reflects the minority viewpoint which
has encountered inhospitable reception outside the State of Tennessee."); see also
Henkin, supra note 4 (suggesting that modem rules of pleading make judicial estop-
pel useless and recommending that the doctrine be abolished).
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should be reinvigorated. Part II of this Comment provides an ex-
amination of the history and policy of the doctrine. Part III distin-
guishes judicial estoppel from other forms of estoppel. Part IV
discusses the relationship between judicial estoppel and Rule
8(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The current ma-
jority and minority positions of judicial estoppel are examined in
Part V. Part VI investigates both California's and the Ninth Cir-
cuit's lack of a position on judicial estoppel, and also argues that
the Ninth Circuit is not bound by the California state laws on ju-
dicial estoppel. Finally, Part VII recommends a new four-part test,
which aids in the determination of how and when it is proper to
apply judicial estoppel. This proposed test seeks to best fulfill the
social policies behind judicial estoppel in a fair yet limited way so
as to help avoid the potentially harsh results of judicial estoppel
when they are unwarranted.
II. THE HISTORY AND POLICY OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
Judicial estoppel finds its origin in the courts of Tennessee.1
In 1857 the Tennessee Supreme Court created the doctrine of ju-
dicial estoppel in Hamilton v. Zimmerman.1 2 Through the creation
of judicial estoppel, the court intended to uphold "the proper rev-
erence for the sanctity of [the] oath. 1 3 The Hamilton court stated,
"This doctrine . . . [has] its foundation in the obligation under
which every man is placed to speak and act, according to the truth
11. Boyers, supra note 4, at 1245-46; Henkin, supra note 4, at 1713.
12. 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 39 (1857). In this landmark case, plaintiff and his partner
owned a drugstore, which they sold to the defendant. Id- at 40. Plaintiff then
worked for defendant for four years until the store was sold. Id. at 43. After the
sale, plaintiff brought suit for a settlement of partnership accounts, claiming he was
entitled to half of the profits because he was defendant's partner during the four
years. Id. at 40-42. Plaintiff claimed that defendant considered him a partner while
defendant countered that plaintiff was merely a clerk. Id. at 42-43.
Later in the case defendant introduced evidence from a previous action. Id
In this previous action, plaintiff's ex-partner claimed that defendant failed to pay him
on the note for the sale of the store. Id. at 47-48. In his reply defendant stated that
plaintiff was his clerk and therefore knew all the debts owed were good. Id. at 47.
Defendant then filed a cross-bill against plaintiff and his ex-partner for a credit the
defendant was owed from the original purchase. Id. Plaintiff answered the cross-bill
by stating he "read carefully the answer of [defendant], and also his bill, and believes
that the allegations in said answer and bill, are substantially true." Id. at 47
(emphasis omitted). The court in the later action then held that plaintiff was judi-
cially estopped to assert he was a partner because he had impliedly asserted to a
prior court under oath that he was not a partner. Id. at 47-48. Plaintiff was therefore
bound to the position that he was a clerk. Id.
13. Id at 48.
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of the case. 14 The court felt that the policy of upholding the sanc-
tity of the oath was compelling enough to disallow inconsistent
statements in later judicial proceedings. Thus, Tennessee applied
judicial estoppel on an absolute basis; any prior position in a judi-
cial proceeding could be used to prevent a later inconsistent posi-
tion, except when the original position resulted from fraud, duress,
or mistake. 5 The absolute rule upholds the sanctity of the oath
and prevents untruths from coming into the court. 6 While many
courts apply judicial estoppel in some limited fashion, Tennessee is
the only jurisdiction that still applies the strict absolute rule of ju-
dicial estoppel.1
7
Although most modem courts accept judicial estoppel, many
differ as to the underlying policies and application of the doc-
trine. 8 Modem courts have identified social policies for the use of
judicial estoppel in addition to Tennessee's absolute rule, which is
aimed at the sanctity of the oath. Many courts argue that judicial
estoppel's primary goal is to afford protection to the judicial proc-
ess by avoiding inconsistent results. 9 Others cast the doctrine's
policy goals in different ways, such as preventing parties from
"playing fast and loose with the courts," 20 or protecting the
"integrity of the judicial process.",2' These policy goals are the
conduit that has allowed the doctrine of judicial estoppel to be-
come a guardian of the judicial process itself. Since its purpose is
the protection of the judicial process, the court has the ability to
raise a judicial estoppel motion sua sponte."
14. l
15. See, e.g., Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Johnson
Serv. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 164, 175 (5th Cir. 1973); Hamilton, 37
Tenn (5 Sneed) at 48.
16. For an interesting discussion of how the early Tennessee courts applied judi-
cial estoppel, see T.H. Malone, The Tennessee Law of Judicial Estoppel, 1 TENN. L.
REv. 1 (1922).
17. Boyers, supra note 4, at 1246; Henkin, supra note 4, at 1713-14.
18. See infra app.
19. See, e.g,. Stevens Tech. Servs. v. SS Brooklyn, 885 F.2d 584, 588-89 (9th Cir.
1989); Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1982); Konstantinidis,
626 F.2d at 937; Johnson, 485 F.2d at 174.
20. Several courts have used the phrase "fast and loose with the court." See e.g.
Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 453 (9th Cir. 1991); Allen, 667 F.2d at 1166; Kon-
stantinidis, 626 F.2d at 937; Scarano v. Central R.R., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953).
21. Allen, 667 F.2d at 1166; Konstantinidis, 626 F.2d at 937.
22. Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Religious Tech.
Ctr. v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir. 1989) (Hall, J., dissenting) ("Because
[judicial estoppel] is intended to protect the integrity of the judicial process, it is an
equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion.").
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Courts also consider the question of fairness. It seems pat-
ently wrong to allow a person to abuse the judicial process by first
swearing to one position, and later, if it becomes beneficial, to as-
sert the opposite. Thus, the courts have invoked judicial estoppel
to prevent fraud on the courts? and to avoid "unfair advantage"
taken against the court by unscrupulous litigants.24
As opposed to the absolute rule, modern courts use a more re-
stricted application of the doctrine to better fit the doctrine's pol-
icy goals. The most notable of these limitations is the "prior suc-
cess" rule. Under this rule, a party is judicially estopped in a later
litigation only if the "party has successfully asserted an inconsis-
tent position in a prior proceeding." 5 It is important to note that
prior success for the purposes of judicial estoppel does not mean
that the party won the lawsuit, but rather, that the court in the first
lawsuit accepted the questioned statement or assertion as true.26
Also, judicial estoppel only applies when a party is asserting a mat-
ter of fact, not law. Furthermore, settlements have no bearing on
judicial estoppel because, in the eyes of the law, no actual assertion
of a specific position was ever accepted by a court. And, a future
23. Schulze v. Schulze, 121 Cal. App. 2d 75, 83, 262 P.2d 646, 650-651 (1953).
24. Scarano, 203 F.2d at 513.
25. Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595,599 (6th Cir. 1982).
26. Id. at 599 n.5.
27. See Allen, 667 F.2d at 1168-69 (Bryan, J., dissenting). The dissent raised the
somewhat troubling issue that plaintiff Allen asserted he was an employee in the first
suit, but the second suit also concerned the issue of Allen's possible employment. Id
at 1168. Therefore, the dissent seems to suggest that had Allen lost the first suit-
hence the holding would have been that Allen was not an employee-Allen would
be held to his assertion he was an employee in later litigation. This erroneous as-
sumption illustrates the difference between asserting a matter of fact versus a matter
of law. At the first trial Allen questioned a matter of law by attempting to prove he
was an employee; he made no assertion that the court adopted until the end of the
trial when Allen was adjudged to be an employee. At that point, Allen's employ-
ment became a matter of fact. Thus, had Allen lost, and then tried to assert he was
not an employee in the second suit against Zurich Insurance he would not have been
held to his statements about employment because the court never adopted the
statement that he was employed. However, once Allen won the first suit, the court
must have accepted the proposition that he was an employee, and thus, Allen was
judicially estopped from then claiming he was not an employee. Id.
28. Edwards, 690 F.2d at 599 (citations omitted). The court stated:
'kA] settlement neither requires nor implies any judicial endorsement of ei-
er parties [sic] claims or theories, and thus, a settlement does not provide
the prior success necessary for judicial estoppel'). Id. The requirement that
the position be successfully asserted means that the party must have been
successful in getting the first court to accept the position. Absent judicial
acceptance of the inconsistent position, application of the rule is unwar-
ranted because no risk of inconsistent results exists.
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change in fact or position that makes the prior statement no longer
valid will of course cause no judicial estoppel effect. Thus, the
prior success rule only deals with the area of an actually litigated
statement of fact asserted to be true and accepted by a court in the
preceding action.
The prior success rule fits well with the policies of protecting
judicial integrity and preventing an abuse of the judicial process."
If a court never adopted the prior statement, there is no danger of
inconsistent results based on that statement. ° If there is no danger
of inconsistent results, then there is no fear of an impairment of
the judicial process. It is also less likely that a litigant will abuse
the judicial process in a later proceeding if the first court never ac-
cepted the original statement. Thus, the policies behind the prior
success rule help to uphold the rational purposes behind judicial
estoppel without the harsh results and overinclusive effect of the
sanctity of the oath policy. If the first court never accepted the
statement, the judicial process itself has suffered no harm from in-
consistent results.3'
III. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DISTINGUISHED FROM CLAIM
PRECLUSION, ISSUE PRECLUSION, AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
While judicial estoppel may at times have the same effect as
other forms of estoppel,3 the elements and policies behind judicial
estoppel are quite different. One court stated, "The policies sup-
porting judicial estoppel are different from those that support the
more common doctrines of issue preclusion, equitable and collat-
eral estoppel." 33 Thus, in order to more clearly understand judicial
estoppel, it must be distinguished from the more common forms of
estoppel.
A. Claim Preclusion (Res Judicata)
Among the various estoppel doctrines, claim preclusion is the
29. There is some debate as to whether a court need adopt a statement to give
rise to judicial estoppel. See infra Part IV.
30. Edwards, 690 F.2d at 599.
31. Boyers, supra note 4, at 1253.
32. It is important to remember that judicial estoppel prevents a party from as-
serting a statement, not an entire lawsuit. However, in most instances, the preclusion
of the statement will estop a party from carrying out a successful lawsuit. In this way,
it is likely that judicial estoppel may very well have similar effects as other forms of
estoppel.
33. Edwards, 690 F.2d at 598.
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least similar to judicial estoppel m Claim preclusion prevents a
party from bringing the same litigation after it has already been
decided on the merits.5 This form of estoppel only operates be-
tween adverse parties who were involved in a prior action against
each other.36 If claim preclusion applies, a party is barred from as-.37
serting a previously adjudicated claim. When a decision on the
merits between two parties becomes final, all possible claims aris-
ing from that transaction or occurence effectively merge into the
judgment if plaintiff prevails; if defendant wins, these future claims
are considered barred.3 ' Either way, claim preclusion denies par-
ties the ability to litigate claims at a later date because the parties
were already afforded the opportunity in the first trial.
Additionally, claim preclusion may never be invoked unless
there is some form of privity between the parties.39 The purpose of
this requirement is to ensure that before parties are precluded
from pursuing a lawsuit, th y must have had at least one chance to
prove the claim or defense. The privity requirement makes sense
since it would be unfair to preclude parties from pursuing a lawsuit
unless they have had at least one opportunity to prove their case.
The policy goals behind claim preclusion include the preser-
vation of judicial resources and the protection of the finality of a
court's judgment . Judicial estoppel, on the other hand, has very
different policy goals.42 Judicial estoppel does not have a privity
requirement and quite often does not even entail the same claim
or occurence.43 Therefore, although claim preclusion and judicial
estoppel may produce the same preclusive effect, 4 the policy goals
and elements of these two doctrines are quite different.
B. Issue Preclusion (Collateral Estoppel)
Issue preclusion resembles judicial estoppel more closely than
34. See Plumer, supra note 4, at 414.
35. See 18 C. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, & ARTHUR R. MILLER ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4406 (1995) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See supra notes 5-7, 19-24 and accompanying text.
43. For a discussion of the modern elements of judicial estoppel, see supra notes
23-28 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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claim preclusion.45 Like claim preclusion, the policy goals behind
issue preclusion are judicial economy and ensuring the finality of a
judgment.4' Thus, the policy goals and elements of issue preclusion
are clearly different than the policy goals of judicial estoppel.47
Issue preclusion can only be invoked when three prerequisite
elements are satisfied: first, the issue must have been actually liti-
gated;4 second, the rendering court must have actually decided the
issue;4 9 and third, the issue sought to be precluded must have been
necessary to the final judgment in the first proceeding.0 Issue
preclusion can be used as a shield by a litigant to prevent another
party from attempting to relitigate an issue at a later trial." Issue
preclusion can also be used as a sword, in that a plaintiff can use a
previous judgment adverse to their opponent against that oppo-
nent for plaintiff's benefit, even if the plaintiff was not a party to
the prior litigation. 2
Judicial estoppel's elements are somewhat different than
those of issue preclusion. 3 This follows logically because the two
doctrines prevent different evils. However, the effect of the two
doctrines may be, and often is, the same. A party, if issue pre-
cluded, will not be able to assert that issue at trial because it was
previously decided. Judicial estoppel can also prevent a party
from introducing an issue at trial if the statement is inconsistent
with a position the party previously advanced. In either case, a
party may be precluded from introducing an issue or statement at
trial, and this could ultimately prove fatal to a claim.
5
45. See Plumer, supra note 4, at 415.
46. See Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins., 690 F.2d 595,599 (6th Cir. 1982).
47. For a discussion of the policy goals of judicial estoppel, see supra notes 5-7
and accompanying text.
48. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 35, § 4406.
49. IL
50. Id
51. For example, if X and Y are in a dispute over ownership of Blackacre, and a
court adjudges X to be the owner, X could block Y from asserting ownership of
Blackacre in a later litigation through the use of issue preclusion.
52. An example of the use of offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel, i.e. the
use of issue preclusion as a sword, would be a case where B, a bus passenger, is suing
C, a bus driver, for negligence. Should B prevail in the litigation, all of the other
passengers on that ill-fated bus trip would be able to use the negligence judgment
against C, even though they were not parties to the original action. However, if C
wins, C may not use that judgment against all of the other bus passengers.
53. For a discussion of the elements of judicial estoppel, see supra notes 23-28
and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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C. Equitable Estoppel
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is most similar to judicial
estoppel.55 In fact, courts frequently confuse the two.5 However,
the two doctrines have different elements and different goals.
To successfully invoke equitable estoppel, a party must estab-
lish that in a prior proceeding (1) the parties were adverse; (2) the
party attempting to assert equitable estoppel detrimentally relied
on their opponent's prior position; and (3) that party would be
prejudiced if the court allowed its opponent to change the prior
positionY7 Thus, unlike judicial estoppel, privity and detrimental
reliance are necessary elements of equitable estoppel.
58
Equitable estoppel protects the integrity of the relationship
between parties.: The Konstantinidis v. Chen court argued that
the purpose of equitable estoppel is "to ensure fairness in the rela-
tionship between parties."6 Thus, equitable estoppel operates to
protect the parties in a litigation from prejudice that may occur
from a change in position.' Judicial estoppel, on the other hand,
aims to prevent a different harm-the harm the judicial process
suffers when litigants take inconsistent positions.6 2 Although these
two doctrines have different purposes and elements, both "prevent
a party from contradicting a position taken in a prior judicial pro-
ceeding."' This similar consequence of these two doctrines may
explain why equitable and judicial estoppel are frequently mis-
taken for each other.
A comparison of judicial estoppel to its cousins, claim preclu-
sion, issue preclusion, and equitable estoppel, demonstrates that
judicial estoppel is an independent doctrine with separate policy
goals and elements. All the estoppel doctrines, when successfully
55. Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Hanford Atomic Metal Trades Council, 851 F.2d
1208, 1210 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988).
56. Ellis v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 609 F.2d 436, 440 (10th Cir. 1979); City of Mi-
ami v. Smith, 551 F.2d 1370, 1377 (5th Cir. 1977); Gleason v. United States, 458 F.2d
171, 175 (3d Cir. 1972); Toman v. Underwriters Labs. Inc., 532 F. Supp 1017, 1019
(D. Mass. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 707 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1983); Boyers, supra
note 4, at 1248-49.
57. Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982); Konstanti-
nidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
58. For a discussion of the elements of judicial estoppel, see supra notes 23-28.
59. Konstantinidis, 626 F.2d at 937.
60. Id.
61. hL
62. See supra notes 5-7, 19-24 and accompanying text.
63. Edwards, 690 F.2d at 598.
November 1996]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA W REVIEW
applied, may ultimately lead to the same result, the demise of a
claim or lawsuit. Although preclusion may occur in different
fashions, and each form of estoppel aims at preventing a specific
evil, the desired end result is the same-the termination of a claim
on procedural grounds. It is clear that while judicial estoppel is the
rarest of the estoppel doctrines, it still retains an important place
in our legal system. When applied properly judicial estoppel pro-
tects important policy goals that are inadequately protected by the
other estoppel doctrines.
IV. Is THERE TENSION BETWEEN RULE 8(E)(2) OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL?
Both courts and scholars have argued that the modem, liberal
pleading rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have made
judicial estoppel an ancient and unnecessary doctrine.6 However,
an examination of Rule 8(e)(2) 5 shows that when judicial estoppel
is properly applied, Rule 8(e)(2) and the doctrine of judicial es-
toppel exist independently and harmoniously. The Parkinson v.
California Co. court concluded that judicial estoppel cannot exist
in light of the "spirit of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
8(e)(2)... [which] would be out of harmony with the great weight
of authority independent of that rule, and would discourage the
determination of cases on the basis of the true facts as they might
be established ultimately." 67 Others also believe that judicial es-
toppel is preempted by Rule 8(e)(2). 8 Advocates of the preemp-
tion argument assert that because the purpose of Rule 8(e)(2) is to
ascertain the truth of matters in the litigation, judicial estoppel will
"foreclose all further inquiry into the underlying claim... [which]
64. Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432,438 (10th Cir. 1956); Henkin, supra
note 4, at 1729-43.
65. Rule 8(e)(2) reads as follows:
A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alter-
nately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alterna-
tive and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the plead-
ing is not made insufficient by the insuffciency of one or more of the alter-
native statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or
defenses as the party has regardless of consistency and whether based on
legal, equitable, or maritime grounds. All statements shall be made subject
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
FED. R. CIv. P. 8(e)(2).
66. 233 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1956).
67. Id. at 438.
68. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 4, at 1729-43.
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plainly conflicts with the truth-seeking function of the courts."69
Subscribers to this theory further argue that judicial estoppel does
not adequately respond to subsequent changes in factual situa-
tions.70
To understand why Rule 8(e)(2) does not preempt judicial es-
toppel, judicial estoppel in the same proceeding must be distin-
guished from judicial estoppel in later proceedings. Generally,
judicial estoppel should not be applied in the same proceeding, es-
pecially if the court subscribes to the adoption theory of judicial
estoppel.71 Thus, other than the old absolute rule-which is pres-
ently applied only in Tennessee7 2 -the modem adoption theory of
judicial estoppel does not prevent litigants from pleading alterna-
tive and inconsistent positions within the same lawsuit. 3 If judicial
estoppel is only applied to subsequent litigations, then judicial es-
toppel will never interfere with the truth-seeking policies behind
Rule 8(e)(2) and a party's ability to plead alternative and inconsis-
tent positions.74
However, the clash between judicial estoppel and Rule 8(e)(2)
is quite a different matter in the context of a later litigation. A
misapplication of this difference of judicial estoppel forms oc-
curred when the Parkinson court faced a situation in which a
worker was injured by an undetected gas leak.75 The worker filed
suit in state and federal court.76 The state court complaint alleged
that both the processor and wholesaler of the gas were negligent
for failing to add an odorizing agent to the gas. The plaintiff also
sued the retailer for failure to inspect the gas and for sending an
69. IL at 1740.
70. Id. at 1733-34.
71. Under an adoption theory judicial estoppel cannot be invoked until a litigant
in a present lawsuit attempts to advance a statement which is inconsistent from that
which they persuaded a prior court to accept as true. Hence, until there is a second
lawsuit, there can be no fear of inconsistent results, and thus, judicial estoppel should
not be invoked for statements made within the same litigation.
72. Parkinson, 233 F.2d at 437-38; Boyers, supra note 4, at 1246.
73. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 35, § 4477 at 786 ("[The] [i]nconsistent
position doctrine must not be allowed to interfere with the modem pleading rules
that expressly permit pursuit of inconsistent positions within a single action.").
74. Since Rule 8(e)(2) only applies within the pleadings of a lawsuit, there is no
danger or fear of prior inconsistent statements reaching the court, except those that
should be barred by a correct application of judicial estoppel.
75. Parkinson, 233 F.2d at 434.
76. Id. at 434-35.
77. Id.
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incompetent employee.71 Plaintiff's federal court pleadings were
the same, except that plaintiff failed to include the retailer as a de-
fendant.79
The district court accepted the retailer's argument that the
plaintiff should have been judicially estopped in federal court be-
cause the complaints were inconsistent. 0 On appeal the Tenth
Circuit rejected the judicial estoppel argument and held that the
pleadings were not truly inconsistent--one pleading merely omit-
ted certain facts.81 The Tenth Circuit should have concluded the
opinion with its holding on judicial estoppel because the court was
correct. There was no occasion to invoke judicial estoppel because
there was no formal adoption of a position by either the state or
federal district court. Instead of ending the inquiry as it should
have, the Tenth Circuit opened a Pandora's box. In dicta the court
opined that the judicial estoppel doctrine should be rejected be-
cause of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(e)(2).2
It was unnecessary for the Tenth Circuit to make this gratui-
tous comment and, by doing so, may have created substantial con-
fusion. In the Parkinson case there was no adoption of any incon-
sistent position.3 The district court was merely confused about
judicial estoppel. The Tenth Circuit should have refrained from
discussing the clash between judicial estoppel and Rule 8(e)(2)
without fully investigating the policies and elements of judicial es-
toppel.
The Parkinson court readily conceded that other forms of es-
toppel, such as claim preclusion and equitable estoppel, can fore-
close a party from pleading these claims or issues in a subsequent
litigation. In fact, it would likely be a violation of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure Rule 1185 to plead a claim that is barred by claim
preclusion. However, the Parkinson court failed to extend this
78. Id. at 435-36.
79. Id. at 434.
80. Id. at 435.
81. Id. at 437-38.
82. Id. at 438.
83. Id. at 434-38.
84. Id. at 438 ("[T]here may be an estoppel by judgment, which is a separate and
distinct concept. But only under conditions giving rise to the application of an equi-
table estoppel ... will prior statements, in and of themselves, foreclose a party from
asserting a contrary position.").
85. "[Tjhe claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification or rever-
sal of existing law or the establishment of new law." FED. R. CIv. P. 11(b)(2)
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line of reasoning to judicial estoppel. It is logically impossible to
plead inconsistent positions in good faith where a court in a prior
litigation has adopted a contrary position; Rule 8(e)(2) does not
clash with the doctrine of judicial estoppel since Rule 8(e)(2) only
allows inconsistent pleadings if they are made in good faith. 6
Thus, judicial estoppel has no "chilling" effect on the inconsis-
tent pleadings provision of Rule 8(e)(2). A litigant cannot in good
faith ask a court to accept a position contrary to one asserted by
the litigant and accepted by the court in a prior litigation. There-
fore, if a prior court is asked to, and actually does adopt an asser-
tion as true, a litigant would be unable to make a good faith asser-
tion that the opposite is now true without a change of
circumstances or some other compelling reason.!
Recent cases provide support to explain the difference be-
tween honest doubt as to the facts of a case and bad faith inconsis-
88 8tency. Unfortunately, the mistaken dicta of one 1956 case" has
led to much confusion and further erroneous opinions as to Rule
8(e)(2)'s effect on judicial estoppel, at least in a minority of the
federal circuits." When examining the adoption theory of judicial
estoppel, as compared to the language and polices of Rule 8(e)(2),
it is quite clear that both of these rules exist independently and
harmoniously.
86. "All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11."
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2)
87. If a court in a prior litigation found that X was an employee of Y, X cannot
claim in good faith that X is not Y's employee in a later litigation.
88. Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1982) (quoting Scarano
v. Central R.R., 203 F.2d 510,513 (3d Cir. 1953)). The court stated that the essential
function of judicial estoppel is:
to prevent the use of "intentional self-contradiction ... as a means of ob-
taining unfair advantage in a forum provided for suitors seeking justice."
This obviously contemplates something other than the permissible practice,
now freely allowed, of simultaneously advancing in the same action incon-
sistent claims or defenses which can then, under appropriate judicial con-
trol, be evaluated as such by the same tribunal, thus allowing an internally
consistent final decision to be reached.
Id.
89. Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1956).
90. See United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land, 802 F.2d 387 (10th Cir. 1986).
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V. AN EXAMINATION OF THE CURRENT MAJORITY AND MINORITY. POSITIONS OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
A. The Majority Position-The Prior Success Rule
The current majority position, accepted in most federal courts,
requires that a party's prior statement was actually accepted as
true by a court or administrative agency before a later court can
invoke judicial estoppel. 9' This position strives to protect the in-
tegrity of the judicial process and to prevent an abuse of the judi-
cial process. As noted earlier, the additional element of adoption
marked a substantial step in the formation of the judicial estoppel
doctrine.93 The prior success rule helps ensure that judicial estop-
pel will only be applied when its application upholds the policies
behind the doctrine.94 However, despite these limitations and
policies, some courts do not require an adopted statement,95 while
others still refuse to recognize judicial estoppel at all.
96
It is evident that judicial estoppel is an independent, useful,
and necessary doctrine in our judicial systemY Furthermore, of all
the existing forms of judicial estoppel-sanctity of the oath,98 fast
and loose, and prior success,O the prior success rule comes clos-
est to fulfilling the policy goals of judicial estoppel. ' However,
even the prior success rule has its drawbacks.""
91. For a full listing of all the federal circuits' positions on judicial estoppel see
Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540 (7th Cir.
1990); American Nat'l Bank v. F.D.I.C., 710 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1983); Edwards v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982); Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d
1162 (4th Cir. 1982); Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1980); City of
Kingsport v. Steel & Roof Structure, Inc., 500 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1974); Scarano v.
Central R.R., 203 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1953); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 35, § 4477
at 662; see infra app.
92. For a full discussion and explanation of the policies and elements of the prior
success rule and the majority position on judicial estoppel, see supra notes 18-31 and
accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
95. See infra Part V.B. for a full discussion of the minority position, which does
not require prior success in order to invoke judicial estoppel.
96. United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land, 802 F.2d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1986)
("The Tenth Circuit, however, has rejected the doctrine of judicial estoppel."),
97. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 35, § 4477, at 779.
98. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
99. See infra Part V.B.
100. See infra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
101. See Boyers, supra note 4, at 1270.
102 Id. at 1256-57.
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The first question for the majority position is the following:
What constitutes a prior success? Interestingly enough, a party
need not have prevailed on the merits to achieve prior success
adequate to invoke judicial estoppel."3 It is sufficient that the
prior court "accepted" the position which is now inconsistent with
the current theory advanced. °4 This rule is inherently logical in
light of the policies behind judicial estoppel. A court's holding on
an issue, whether favorable or unfavorable to a litigant, should be
the final determination on that issue. If a litigant loses on the
merits because a certain issue was decided unfavorably, the litigant
should be held to that finding regardless of the holding on the
merits.'0 5
However, even though it is clear that the prior success rule
does not require victory on the merits, the definition of adoption is
still unclear.' 6 For example, a subsequent court may have diffi-
culty determining which positions or facts were accepted as true by
the first court. This task becomes especially arduous if the jury
does not return a special verdict or, in a bench trial, if the judge
does not prepare written findings of fact. In some cases the verdict
makes factual determinations obvious.' 7 In other cases it is im-
possible to determine certain facts based on the verdict alone.
There may be ambiguities in a written opinion that a later court
must resolve before it can determine if it is an appropriate occa-
sion to invoke judicial estoppel.' 8 The test proposed in this Com-
ment helps to alleviate these problematic areas of the adoption
theory.'m
A court in a subsequent proceeding may be unable to deter-
mine if the present litigant's position is truly inconsistent with a
position adopted in an earlier litigation. There may be insufficient
evidence left from the first court to enable a second court to de-
termine if it is appropriate to apply judicial estoppel. The later
103. Edwards, 690 F.2d at 599 n.5 ("A party need not finally prevail on the merits
in the first proceeding.").
104. Konstantinidis, 626 F.2d at 937 n.6.
105. See Edwards, 690 F.2d at 599.
106. See Boyers, supra note 4, at 1256.
107. See, e.g., Allen, 667 F.2d at 1163-66 (finding that plaintiff's recovery of
worker's compensation from his employer necessarily precluded plaintiff's later
claim that he was not an employee when the second case was based on the same set
of facts).
108. See Boyers, supra note 4, at 1257.
109. See infra Part VII.
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court may very well have to decide for itself if the prior court ac-
cepted the litigant's original statement as true.1 If the later court
is placed in a situation where it must decide whether to apply ju-
dicial estoppel, and the facts are ambiguous, the court should re-
member that judicial estoppel can have "extreme" m and "harsh"
results.12 Thus, because of the judicial policy of seeking truth, and
the fact that a party's entire lawsuit may be at stake, judicial es-
toppel "is... to be applied with caution."13 If a court is faced with
an unclear record and the possibility of a judicial estoppel motion
exists, the court should be hesitant to apply the doctrine unless it is
unmistakably clear that a truly inconsistent position has been
taken.
B. The Minority Position-"Playing Fast and Loose" With the
Court-The Patriot Cinemas Case
Unlike the majority's prior success rule, which requires the
court to adopt a litigant's statement,'14 the minority position re-
quires no such adoption."' The key-and apparently only-case
for the minority position is Patriot Cinemas Inc., v. General Cin-
ema Corp."' In fact, Patriot Cinemas seems to be the case that
created the minority position. The minority position as stated in
Patriot Cinemas is "the sort of self-serving self-contradiction, or
'playing fast and loose with the courts,' that is barred by the doc-
trine of judicial estoppel."' 1 7 Thus, according to the Patriot Cine-
mas court, the minority form is different from the "'classic' case of
judicial estoppel""8 in that there need be no form of adoption,
merely any form of "playing fast and loose with the court."".9
In Patriot Cinemas, Patriot Cinemas sued General Cinema in
110. See Boyers, supra note 4, at 1257.
111. USLIFE Corp. v. United States Life Ins. Co., 560 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (N.D.
Tex. 1983).
112 See Henkin, supra note 4, at 1717.
113. Allen, 667 F.2d at 1167.
114. See supra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
115. Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448,453 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The minority view, in
contrast, holds that the [judicial estoppel] doctrine applies even if the litigant was
unsuccessful in asserting the inconsistent position ...
116. 834 F.2d 208 (1st Cir. 1987).
117. Id at 213.
118. Id. at 214.
119. Id. at 212 (citing Judge Hastie's famous description of the fast and loose
provision of judicial estoppel in Scarano v. Central R.R., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir.
1953)).
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Massachusetts Superior Court in February 1986.' The complaint
alleged four counts, all allegedly based on Massachusetts state law:
(1) unfair business practice; (2) violation of a statute regulating
bidding practice in the movie theater industry; (3) violation of the
state antitrust statute; and (4) common law tortious interference
with contractual relations.12' In April 1986 General Cinema re-
moved the case to federal court, claiming the state antitrust claim
was merely a disguised federal antitrust claim.l 2 Through a series
of complex procedural maneuvers, General Cinemas was able to
persuade the federal district court to dismiss the entire case with-
out prejudice.m
Patriot Cinemas was unsuccessful in its appeal of the dismissal
and was also unable to convince the district court to remand the
matter to state court.2 4 On January 20, 1987, Patriot filed a fresh
action in Massachusetts Superior Court.'5 On March 6, 1987,
General Cinemas requested the superior court to stay the new
proceeding while the appeal of dismissal by the federal court was
pending. General Cinema argued that allowing the state action
to proceed on the three counts-excluding the antitrust claim-
during the federal court appeal could lead to a duplicate recovery
and a waste of judicial resources. 127 Patriot responded by filing a
memorandum in superior court arguing against a stay of the state
proceeding involving the three state counts.' 28 In its opposition to
the stay, Patriot represented that it would not pursue a separate
claim based on state antitrust law regardless of the outcome of the
pending federal appeal.29 On March 18, 1987, the Massachusetts
Superior Court denied defendant's motion for a stay without stat-
ing the reason for the denial.3 '
On April 14, 1987, General Cinemas filed a motion to dismiss
the pending federal appeal as moot. 3' General Cinemas argued
that since Patriot was bound by its claim to the state court that it
120. Id. at209.
121. Id at 210.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 211.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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would not pursue the antitrust claim, the pending federal appeal
was moot because the antitrust claim was now itself moot. General
Cinemas further argued that the remaining three claims were al-
ready being tried in the state court.3 1 On April 17, 1987, Patriot
filed a memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion for dis-
missal.'33 In this memorandum Patriot retracted its assertion that it
would not pursue the antitrust claim. Although Patriot claimed it
"had no real desire" to pursue the antitrust claim, Patriot asserted
that they might go forward with the antitrust claim if
"developments in the litigation ma[de] it appropriate.
' '
1
34
Patriot's strategy did not persuade the court. The court held
that "[t]he alleged self-contradiction here is Patriot's prior repre-
sentation in the Massachusetts state court that it would not prose-
cute the state antitrust count and its subsequent repudiation of that
intention. We conclude that Patriot has engaged in the sort of 'fast
and loose' behavior that warrants application of judicial estop-
pel.
, 135
In finding that judicial estoppel applied, the court went on to
state:
Patriot can be said to have made a bargain with the supe-
rior court. It traded its chance for success on the antitrust
claim for an increased pace in the proceedings on the re-
maining three counts.... Now, however, Patriot wants to
have it the other way: it wants to revive its antitrust claim
and have it remanded to the state court while enjoying the
benefit of the increased pace of its current state action-a
benefit obtained by telling the superior court that it would
not proceed with its antitrust claim. This is the sort of
self-serving self-contradiction, or 'playing fast and loose
with the courts' that is barred by the doctrine of judicial
estoppel.'36
The court then held that judicial estoppel bound Patriot to its
original assertion in state court and therefore, Patriot could not
proceed on its antitrust claim.3 Thus, Patriot's federal appeal was
132 Id
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id at 212.
136. Id. at 213.
137. Id. at 214.
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dismissed."'
The First Circuit correctly held that Patriot's appeal should
have been dismissed. While it is obvious that Patriot played fast
and loose with the court, either this case fit the classic, prior suc-
cess rule of judicial estoppel, or if not, then judicial estoppel was
not the correct basis upon which to dismiss Patriot's appeal.
The facts of Patriot Cinemas appear to fit the majority's posi-
tion on judicial estoppel. However, the First Circuit apparently
failed to understand the prior success rule. Patriot made a repre-
sentation that it would dismiss its antitrust claim if the Massachu-
setts Superior Court would deny General Cinema's request for a
stay.39 Although the Massachusetts Superior Court did not write
an opinion expressing why it rejected the stay, the denial could
only have been based on Patriot's representation, since there was
no other adequate basis for the denial of General Cinema's mo-
tion.'40 If this was the case, then the Massachusetts Superior Court
adopted Patriot's position; this is the only conclusion consistent
with the rejection of the stay.
141
Patriot's motion to the First Circuit made an inconsistent
statement-that it would consider pursuing its antitrust claim-in
direct contrast to Patriot's earlier representation to the Massachu-
setts Superior Court, which adopted the inconsistent position that
Patriot would not pursue its antitrust claim. 42 Therefore, it seems
the First Circuit was incorrect when it stated that this case "is dif-
ferent from the 'classic' case of judicial estoppel. '1 43 In this case
the prior court adopted a party's statement as true, and then the
party attempted to plead a statement inconsistent from the one the
prior court adopted.1 " Thus, the facts of Patriot Cinemas clearly fit
the classic, majority definition of judicial estoppel.
Furthermore, in this case there was no problem with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(e)(2) because these were two separate
138. Id. at 218.
139. Id. at 211.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142- Id. at 210-11.
143. Id. at 214.
144. The First Circuit itself said, "[We hold, therefore, that the doctrine of judi-
cial estoppel bars Patriot from changing the position it previously took in the superior
court that it does not intend to proceed on the state antitrust claim 'at all."' Id.
(emphasis added).
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litigations.' 45 Although this situation may have appeared to be the
same case, it was, in fact, two separate cases with the same factual
situation. If Patriot's twin cases had been in one court, there could
well have been problems with Rule 8(e)(2), which might not have
allowed Patriot to change positions within one lawsuit. However,
Patriot was dealing with two separate courts, and judicial estoppel
precludes a party from convincing one court to adopt a position as
true and then attempting to persuade another court to accept the
exact opposite.
If, as the First Circuit believed, there was no actual adoption
of Patriot's position by the Massachusetts Superior Court, hence
preventing the creation of a classic case of judicial estoppel,' then
judicial estoppel was not the correct way to dispose of the case. It
appears that the Patriot Cinemas court misinterpreted Judge
Hastie's explanation of "playing fast and loose with the courts" in
the Scarano v. Central Railroad 7 case. In Scarano Judge Hastie
used the phrase "playing fast and loose with the courts" to explain
that if a prior court has adopted an inconsistent statement, inten-
tional self-contradiction would "most flagrantly exemplify ... an
evil the courts should not tolerate.""' Judge Hastie never stated
that playing fast and loose was enough to give rise to judicial es-
toppel in and of itself, but this is exactly how the Patriot Cinemas
court based its decision." 9 The policies behind judicial estoppel
demand that there be an adoption by a prior court.50 If there was
no adoption by a prior court, the purposes behind the judicial es-
toppel doctrine are unfulfilled.' Thus, it seems inappropriate to
apply judicial estoppel every time a court decides that a litigant is
playing fast and loose with the judicial system.
The other key problem with applying the fast and loose doc-
trine-if indeed it really exists at all-is the question of determin-
ing what behavior fits within the definition of playing fast and
loose with the court? Patriot Cinemas appears to be the only fed-
eral case which finds judicial estoppel based solely on the grounds
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 203 F.2d 510,513 (3d Cir. 1953).
148. Id.
149. 834 F.2d at 212-15.
150. For a review of the main policies of judicial estoppel such as preventing in-
consistent results and preventing an abuse of the judicial process, see supra notes 5-7,
19-24 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
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of fast and loose behavior. 52 Therefore, there was, and still is, no
suitable precedent or test for a court to decide what constitutes
fast and loose behavior sufficient to warrant the application of ju-
dicial estoppel. This ambiguity could lead to much confusion and
misapplication of the doctrine in future decisions. Thus, if the Pa-
triot Cinemas court truly believed that the elements of classic judi-
cial estoppel had not been met, 53 then the court should have been
wary to apply the doctrine at all.
There are other ways the case could have been disposed of.
For example, the First Circuit could have held that Patriot waived
or released its antitrust claim. The court could also have held that
Patriot entered into a contract with the Massachusetts Superior
Court, and thus the contract could be enforced by an injunction
barring the pursuit of the antitrust claim. Or, most appropriately,
the First Circuit could have dismissed the case because it fit the
classic, majority position definition of judicial estoppel.
The First Circuit, however, was not incorrect in looking at the
fast and loose element of judicial estoppel as explained in the Sca-
rano case.'5 Whereas playing fast and loose with the courts should
not, by itself, be a sufficient condition to apply judicial estoppel, it
remains an important element of the doctrine.15  A court should
look at the policies behind judicial estoppel and realize that, unless
a litigant intentionally "used [self-contradiction] as a means of ob-
taining unfair advantage in a forum provided for suitors seeking
justice, ' 5 the policies behind the doctrine do not outweigh the
harsh result, which is often the effect of the application of judicial
estoppel. 7 Although the Patriot Cinemas court may have misap-
plied the adoption theory of judicial estoppel, it was certainly cor-
rect in its assertion that "[j]udicial estoppel should be employed
when a litigant is 'playing fast and loose with the courts.' ' 58 How-
ever, the policies behind judicial estoppel make it clear that play-
152. An examination of the other federal judicial estoppel cases shows that while
many have acknowledged the Patriot Cinemas minority position, none have ever ac-
cepted it for their own.
153. Patriot Cinemas, 834 F.2d at 214.
154. 203 F.2d at 513.
155. Id. Although Judge Hastie does not directly state this proposition, it can be
inferred that Judge Hastie felt that a court should be hesitant to apply judicial estop-
pel unless it is apparent that a litigant is attempting to intentionally self-contradict a
prior position adopted by a court.
156. Id.
157. See Henkin, supra note 4, at 1716.
158. Patriot Cinemas, 834 F.2d at 212 (citing Scarano, 203 F.2d at 513).
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ing fast and loose with the court should not, in and of itself, be
enough to permit a court to invoke judicial estoppel. Instead,
playing fast and loose should be an important element in deciding
whether or not to invoke judicial estoppel. An analysis of this
element should be included in all judicial estoppel decisions be-
cause the policy goals behind judicial estoppel . will best be ful-
filled, and the harsh results of the doctrine will best be avoided, if
the doctrine is only applied when a litigant engages in intentional
self-contradiction.
VI. CALIFORNIA AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT: THE ROAD NOT YET
TAKEN
As of the writing of this Comment, both the California state
courts and the Ninth Circuit have repeatedly claimed that they ac-
cept the doctrine of judicial estoppel, however both have yet to
decide which position-majority or minority-they will adopt.
Perhaps a primary reason for this indecision is that a case has not
yet arisen in which the judiciary was forced to take one position or
the other. Thus, California and Ninth Circuit courts have been af-
forded the opportunity to adopt judicial estoppel without actually
having to announce a specific position. It is likely that the doctrine
of judicial estoppel has not been explained by these courts because
the doctrine is not well known, and the courts have had few oppor-
tunities in which to examine it. However, this Comment has
stressed that judicial estoppel is an important doctrine, which en-
compasses key social policies. If judges and attorneys become
more familiar with the doctrine and its applications, judicial estop-
pel will prove a valuable tool in both the California and Ninth Cir-
cuit courts.
A. California and Judicial Estoppel
There are precious few judicial estoppel cases in the immense
body of California case law. Moreover, these few cases have failed
to create a usable precedent for judicial estoppel. California
judges have given short shrift to the matter. In fact, no reported
case in the last fifty years has even been decided on judicial estop-
pel grounds.'O Even Witkin's16 ' has not addressed the doctrine.
159. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
160. It is quite possible that some cases may have arisen in which a court could
have decided that judicial estoppel was appropriate, however, it is likely that the
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The California appellate courts have said, "[t]he proper applica-
tion of this doctrine is at best uncertain."16 2 The precise elements
of judicial estoppel have not been propounded in California be-
cause there just has not been case law where a precise definition
was necessary. The vicious circle further perpetuates itself be-
cause if there is a case where judicial estoppel would be appropri-
ate, then it would be almost impossible for a California attorney or
judge to find information-let alone even know about the doc-
trine. Thus, ignorance and lack of case precedent begets even
more ignorance and lack of case precedent regarding the state of
judicial estoppel in California courts.
Judicial estoppel has been described by the California courts
as, "play[ing] fast and loose with the court.... One to whom two
inconsistent courses of action are open and who elects to pursue
one of them is afterward precluded from pursuing the other."
'1 3
California courts have also said, "[t]he [judicial] estoppel
[doctrine] cannot be invoked where the first position was not
clearly inconsistent so that holding one position necessarily ex-
cludes the other. Nor can it be asserted where the first position
was based upon ignorance of facts."1 4 Recently, the California
Court of Appeals stated, "[j]udicial estoppel is an equitable doc-
trine aimed at preventing fraud on the courts.... The purpose of
judicial estoppel is to prevent injury to an innocent litigant." 1
65
These few quotes are difficult to synthesize, and yet they con-
stitute most of what has been stated in California judicial estoppel
decisions. The California courts seem unclear as to whether they
take the majority adoption theory or the minority fast and loose
position. No California court has ever discussed whether a prior
inconsistent position needs to be adopted by a court before judicial
doctrine was not argued because it was unknown to either the courts or litigants at
the time.
161. Bernard E. Witkin's series of treatises summarizes California law and pro-
vides a comprehensive summary of California law, evidence, and procedure. They
are an important resource for many California attorneys and are considered solid
and persuasive authority.
162. Ng v. Hudson, 75 Cal. App. 3d 250,258,142 Cal. Rptr. 69,76 (1977).
163. Schulze v. Schulze, 121 Cal. App. 2d 75,83,262 P.2d 646, 650 (1953).
164. Ng, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 258,142 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
165. In re Marriage of Dekker, 17 Cal. App. 4th 842,850,21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642,646
(1993). Two recent California cases in the bankruptcy context have affirmed the vi-
ability of the doctrine where a debtor has failed to list a pending lawsuit, although
the doctrine is not mentioned in great detail. Billmeyer v. Plaza Bank of Commerce,
42 Cal. App. 4th 1086, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 119 (1995); Conrad v. Bank of America, 44
Cal. App. 4th 317,52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 142 (1996).
November 1996]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
estoppel can be invoked by the later court. Again, this is most
likely the result of the fact that there has been no case in which it
became necessary for the California courts to develop a precise
definition of the doctrine. However, from these few opinions one
thing is clear: California accepts judicial estoppel in some form.
This acceptance clearly indicates that the judiciary of California
recognizes that there are important and unique policy concerns in-
herent in the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Thus, should a case
arise in which the California courts can apply the doctrine of judi-
cial estoppel, the judiciary will have an excellent opportunity to
define the elements and conditions for the application of judicial
estoppel in California.
B. The Ninth Circuit: Many Opportunities, but No Decision
Unlike the California courts, the Ninth Circuit has had several
opportunities in recent years to decide which form of judicial es-
toppel to adopt. Despite several opportunities, the Ninth Circuit
has repeatedly said that, although it accepts the doctrine of judicial
estoppel, it has yet to decide the specific elements.' However, the
Ninth Circuit has discussed the doctrine of judicial estoppel in
great detail.67 Moreover, it is clear that the Ninth Circuit has ac-
cepted the doctrine, and should a case arise where the court needs
to decide the elements of judicial estoppel, it most likely will do so.
However, like the California courts, the Ninth Circuit has not had
a case requiring it to designate the elements of judicial estoppel
and decide which position to take.
The Ninth Circuit has "acknowledged that the doctrine of ju-
dicial estoppel acts to bar inconsistent positions but has not stated
the requirements for the application of the doctrine.' '68 Thus, like
166. See Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1991); Milgard Tempering,
Inc., 902 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1990); Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1990); Ste-
vens Technical Servs. v. S.S. Brooklyn, 885 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1989); Religious Tech.
Ctr. v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1989) (Hall, J., dissenting); Rockwell Int'l Corp.
v. Hanford Atomic Metal Trades Council, 851 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1988); Arizona v.
Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1984); Garcia v. Andrus, 692 F.2d 89
(9th Cir. 1982).
167. See Morris, 966 F.2d at 448; Russell, 893 F.2d at 1033; Stevens Tech. Servs.,
885 F.2d at 584; Garcia, 692 F.2d at 89.
168. Stevens, 885 F.2d at 589. In this case, the court held that under either the
majority or minority position there was no judicial estoppel. Id. The Ninth Circuit
has also had several other opportunities to decide the law of judicial estoppel, but
has declined to accept a position, using the same logic. See, e.g., Milgard, 902 F.2d at
716 (holding that judicial estoppel did not apply under either majority or minority
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California, the Ninth Circuit accepts the doctrine, and thereby
implicitly recognizes the value of judicial estoppel and its policies.
However, unless the Ninth Circuit decides on the proper form and
application of the doctrine, district court judges will be unclear on
when to apply judicial estoppel and much of the value of the doc-
trine will be lost. Thus, the logical course of action is for the Ninth
Circuit to take charge. When the appropriate case arises, the
Ninth Circuit should be the first court to set forth clear elements
for judicial estoppel and give judges and lawyers an idea as to how
and when to use the doctrine.
1. The Rolfs and Morris cases-a new element: The balancing of
judicial estoppel's policies versus the right at stake in the case
The Ninth Circuit has recently decided two landmark judicial
estoppel cases-both in the criminal law area-that add a new di-
mension and element to the doctrine of judicial estoppel: the im-
portance of the right at issue in the case.
In Russell v. Rolfs'69 the Washington Court of Appeals af-
firmed the rape and attempted murder convictions of defendant
Russell.' Russell then sought habeas corpus, but was denied by
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington"'
because the court accepted Washington's argument that "federal
review was not proper because Russell had 'an adequate and
available state court remedy through a Personal Restraint Peti-
tin.,,172tion.
' '
Russell then filed a Personal Restraint Petition in December
1986 in the Washington Supreme Court.' 3 In state court the State
of Washington successfully argued that Russell's petition was pro-
cedurally barred because "Russell had raised the same issues on
direct appeal [to the federal court]. ' 74 Russell then appealed to
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.'75
The Ninth Circuit said, "[t]his language [the state's argument
position); Rockwell, 851 F.2d at 1211 (holding that judicial estoppel is not appropri-
ate to bar claim, appeal reversed on other grounds); Shamrock Foods, 729 F.2d at
1215 (holding that there was no intentional self contradiction to warrant application
of judicial estoppel).
169. 893 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1990).
170. Id. at 1035.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1037.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1034.
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to the Washington Supreme Court that Russell was not now able
to raise a personal restraint petition] is flatly inconsistent with the
state's previous representation of June 5, 1986 in federal court that
Russell's remedy in the state courts through the personal restraint
petition procedure was presently 'adequate and available." '2 76 Es-
sentially, Washington argued two inconsistent positions-first that
an adequate and available remedy existed in state court, and "[t]he
use of these two adjectives in tandem [adequate and available] was
tantamount to advising the federal district court that Russell would
be given a hearing in state court on the merits of his claims."'
'
Then, in the Washington Supreme Court, the State took the in-
consistent position that "appellant's petition for relief [should be
denied] on the theory he was actually procedurally barred in state
court." Thus, in holding that judicial estoppel applied against
the State, the court said "[tlhe state prevailed by telling the state
court the opposite of what it told the federal court. The proposi-
tion that the state can be estopped from relying on the advantage
it gained by doing so seems unremarkable.'
79
Judicial estoppel therefore was invoked to estop the State
from "arguing in federal court that Russell's claims are proce-
durally barred.""18 The use of judicial estoppel in this case shows
its importance in the judicial system. First, it is important to note
that the Ninth Circuit recognized judicial estoppel, and in deciding
the Russell case on judicial estoppel grounds, proved it was willing
to use this doctrine when appropriate. Moreover, when looking at
the particular facts of this case, it appears that no other form of es-
toppel would have stopped the State of Washington from engaging
in this type of intentional self-contradiction. Had judicial estoppel
not been invoked in this case, Russell would have lost very impor-
tant constitutional rights because of Washington's contradictory
and crafty position switching.
Furthermore, without directly saying so outright, the Ninth
Circuit implicitly examined the importance of the rights that would
have been lost had judicial estoppel not been applied. In the Rus-
sell case, the Ninth Circuit said, "[t]hus, in the state's view, there
was no remedy available to the defendant. The state should have
176. Id. at 1037.
177. Id. at 1038.
178. Id.
179. Id
180. Id. at 1039.
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told the district court that such was the state's view . . . [T]his
strikes us not only as appropriate, but also easy and obvious." '81
The Russell court did not say outright that because the impor-
tant constitutional right of habeas corpus would have been lost, it
gave higher scrutiny to Washington's inconsistent positions and
applied judicial estoppel. However, this line of thinking may have
led the Ninth Circuit to add an important new element-the im-
portance of the right asserted-to the doctrine of~udicial estoppel,
when a year later it decided Morris v. California.
The Morris case marks an important addition to the judicial
estoppel doctrine. Here, defendant Karen Morris was found guilty
of drug offenses in a California court."' On appeal Morris at-
tempted to argue that she received ineffective assistance of counsel
because although she admitted to her lawyer that she had ingested
methamphetamines legally, her lawyer informed her not to men-
tion it at trial."' So, when placed on the stand, Morris testified
"she had taken only three prescription drugs-Tylenol with codeine,
Fiorinal, and penicillin.)
185
Morris wanted to argue to the federal district court that she
had perjured herself on the advice of her lawyer."' However, the
district court held that judicial estoppel barred Morris from assert-
ing this position because it was inconsistent from the position she
took at an earlier trial.187
When faced with this yet unseen situation on appeal, the
Ninth Circuit decided it was time to add an important element to
judicial estoppel. The court held, "the doctrine of judicial estoppel
may not be invoked where its use would serve to keep a conviction
in effect regardless of the innocence or guilt of the defendant.""'
The court's rationale for this holding was that:
No circuit has ever applied the doctrine of judicial estop-
pel to bar a criminal defendant from asserting a claim
based on innocence either on direct appeal or on habeas
corpus, and we will not do so now.... [T]he doctrine of
judicial estoppel serves the function of preserving the in-
181. Id. at 1038.
182. 966 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1991).
183. I& at 450.
184. Id. at 452.
185. Id. (footnote omitted).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 453.
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tegrity of the judicial process. Where a defendant who
claims to be innocent allegedly made untruthful state-
ments solely because her attorney was ignorant of the law
and told her incorrectly that telling the truth would con-
stitute the admission of a crime, the integrity of the judi-
cial process is best preserved by permitting the judiciary
to consider her claim. Justice would not be served by
holding defendant to her prior false statements, because
to do so would assign a higher value to the 'sanctity of the
oath' than to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Be-
cause the conviction of an innocent person as a result of
her lawyer's incompetence constitutes one of the most
serious infringements of the integrity of the judicial proc-
ess, our concerns over compromising the 'sanctity of the
oath' must yield. The judicial process can more easily
survive a rule that precludes the use of judicial estoppel to
keep intact convictions of innocent persons than it can a
rule that purports to preserve judicial sancrosanctity by
leaving wrongful convictions in place as a sanction for ly-
ing. 1
89
The Ninth Circuit in Morris thus added an important new bal-
ancing test to judicial estoppel. Essentially, the reasoning in Mor-
ris allowed the court to hold that some rights are more important
than procedural devices. If the fundamental purpose of judicial es-
toppel is to protect the integrity of the courts, how just would the
judicial system be if an innocent person could be incarcerated
solely because of a procedural device? The Morris case is a
monumental decision and marks an important step-if not a giant
leap-in the formation of the judicial estoppel doctrine. The case
stands for the principle that a fair and just judicial system must
place some personal rights and individual liberties above proce-
dural devices designed for expediency and integrity.9 ' The Ninth
Circuit reached the correct decision in declining to apply judicial
estoppel-even though this case met all of the elements-because
the court properly balanced the policies of judicial estoppel versus
the important rights at stake and subordinated the less important
policy.
189. l
190. Id.
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C. The Erie Question
Another question confronting a federal court that desires to
apply judicial estoppel is whether judicial estoppel is an independ-
ent federal doctrine or whether the federal court must apply state
law. In the Russell case the Ninth Circuit was required to deter-
mine whether the federal or state version of judicial estoppel ap-
plied to the case."' The Ninth Circuit stated that, "[e]ach court,
state and federal, is entitled to have whatever rules of judicial es-
toppel it considers necessary to protect its dignity and it [sic] sys-
tem of justice. That Washington may have a more limited or dif-
ferent view of judicial estoppel does not preclude us from
determining what rule is appropriate for our purposes."' 2 There is
a split among the federal circuits as to whether state or federal law
applies to the question of judicial estoppel in diversity cases.'9'
In order to determine whether federal or state judicial estop-
pel law should be applied in diversity cases, federal courts have
looked to the case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.1 14 Under the
Erie interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act,19 federal courts
must apply substantive state laws in all diversity actions. 96 Thus, if
judicial estoppel is found to be substantive rather than procedural,
the federal court will be compelled to apply state judicial estoppel
law.
However, it is a difficult task to define which laws create sub-
191. Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033,1038 (9th Cir. 1990).
192. Id.
193. Some courts have held that judicial estoppel is an independent federal doc-
trine. See Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 nA (6th Cir. 1982)
(holding that because judicial estoppel primarily concerns federal interests, "federal
courts must be free to develop principles that most adequately serve their institu-
tional interests"); Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1167 n.4 (4th Cir. 1982)
(holding that "federal law controls the application of judicial estoppel, since it relates
to protection of the integrity of the federal judicial process"). But see In re South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 535 F.2d 859, 861 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that, "'[in diver-
sity litigation in the federal courts where nonfederal issues are at stake, probably the
Erie... [decision] compel[Is] the application of the relevant state formulation of the
[judicial estoppel] principle, if any'); Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 937-38
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)) (discussing
Court's obligation to apply the District of Columbia's law on judicial estoppel);
Sholly v. Annan, 450 F.2d 74,76 n.4 (9th Cir. 1971) (noting that the federal court was
obliged to apply the Arizona law of judicial estoppel or a diversity court's best esti-
mate of what the Arizona court would hold regarding judicial estoppel).
194. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
195. Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1995).
196. Erie, 304 U.S. at 71-78.
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stantive rights and which are merely procedural. Fortunately,
some later cases have given the courts some guidelines for defining
substance versus procedure. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York"9' clari-
fied the definition of substantive rights by focusing on whether a
state rule defined legal rights and whether a federal court's disre-
gard for that state law would "significantly affect the result of a
litigation." '198 The Guaranty Trust Court defined procedural rules
as those "[which] concern[] merely the manner and means by
which a right.., is enforced.""9
The Supreme Court further qualified the Erie doctrine in Byrd
v. Blue Ridge Electrical Cooperative.2 ° The Court held that even if
a rule may change the outcome of a case, federal courts need not
apply state law if such an application would offend an important
federal judicial policy.211 Thus, a countervailing federal policy
made it possible for the federal court to try that case with a jury-
as mandated by federal law-as opposed to a judge-as mandated
by state law.m
Even with the guidelines of Guaranty Trust and Byrd in mind,
it remains difficult to determine whether judicial estoppel is sub-
stantive or procedural, as evidenced by the split in the federal cir-
cuits. 2 3 While the federal circuits have debated whether this doc-
trine is substantive or procedural, the arguments of the courts
finding judicial estoppel to be procedural-and thus an independ-
ent federal doctrine, such as the Edwards and Allen courts24--are
more persuasive and logical. In light of the policies behind judicial
estoppel, especially the fact that the doctrine is designed to protect
the integrity of the court itself,25 judicial estoppel appears to be a
procedural device. Since this doctrine protects the courts and not
the individual litigants, it is clear that judicial estoppel creates no
substantive rights .2o Also, since judicial estoppel is for the court's
own protection from inconsistent results, each sovereign court
197. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
198. Id. at 109.
199. Id.
200. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
201. Id. at 536-39.
202. I. at 538.
203. See cases cited supra note 193. Since there is a split in the federal circuits as
to the nature and elements of judicial estoppel, it seems that this would be a question
for the Supreme Court to resolve, were a ripe case to arise. See infra app.
204. See cases cited supra note 193.
205. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
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should be allowed to decide how far judicial estoppel's shield of
protection will extend in their own courtroom. Furthermore, it is
possible that under Byrd, preventing abuse of the judicial process
may be held a countervailing federal policy, in which case federal
judicial estoppel would automatically be appliedY7 Either way,
judicial estoppel appears to be more of a procedural device, a rule
that structures and regulates the judicial process. Thus, until the
Supreme Court makes a final decision, federal courts should hold
that judicial estoppel is an independent federal doctrine and that
federal courts should apply their own definition of the doctrine.
VII. RECOMMENDATION: JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL NEEDS CLEARLY
DEFINED ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO MAKE IT A VIABLE AND USEFUL
DOCTRINE FOR BOTH JUDGES AND LAWYERS
This Comment has attempted to enlighten the legal commu-
nity as to the important strategic uses and policy considerations of
the judicial estoppel doctrine. A recurring theme throughout this
Comment has been that even though judicial estoppel is a rare and
somewhat unknown doctrine, it still contains very important and
unique policies, which have a necessary place in our current legal
system.
Throughout its history, judicial estoppel has been a confusing
and unknown doctrine, most likely because "[t]he circumstances
under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be invoked are
probably not reducible to any general formulation of princi-
ple.... ,,2" Therefore, judicial estoppel requires clearly defined
elements, just like its cousins: claim preclusion, issue preclusion,
and equitable estoppel. A clearly defined set of elements in ac-
cordance with the policy goals of judicial estoppel would remedy
the confusion surrounding this doctrine and provide guidance to
courts as to when judicial estoppel should be applied. Thus, based
on the opinions of several courts and the policy goals of judicial es-
toppel, this Comment proposes a four-part test, which would help
courts decide when an application of judicial estoppel is warranted
and appropriate.
207. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537-38.
208. Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162,1166 (4th Cir. 1982).
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A. The Test
1. Actually litigated
The first prong of the judicial estoppel test is that the claimed
statement or position was actually litigated and adopted in a prior
court or administrative proceeding. Settlements have no judicial
estoppel effect because there is no position that was adopted by
any court.2° Settlements have no danger of any damage of incon-
sistent results in the court because there was never any court pro-
ceeding. Thus, there must be some form of litigation before there
can be any fear of inconsistent results, which makes the protection
of judicial estoppel necessary.
2. Assertion clearly adopted as true by earlier court
The second prong is similar to the majority's adoption theory.
The majority position appears to best fulfill the policy goals of ju-
dicial estoppel by requiring the first court to adopt a statement as
true.210 However, to avoid confusion as to what was adopted, the
court should be "unequivocally clear" that it actually adopted the
purported factual position as true. Should a court be faced with a
situation where it is unclear whether the prior court adopted a
statement in question, the second court should decline to apply the
potentially harsh results of judicial estoppel, unless it is clear that
the litigant is attempting to advance a position that is truly incon-
sistent with the prior adopted position. However, once a court has
clearly adopted a litigant's position, the classic case of judicial es-
toppel arises. This is the type of case where all of the policies of
judicial estoppel come into play and judicial estoppel should be
applied.
3. Inconsistency must reach the level of playing fast and loose with
the court before applying judicial estoppel
Even if a court has adopted a prior inconsistent statement, it
seems unfair to apply the harsh and damaging remedy of judicial
estoppel unless the litigant has intentionally taken an inconsistent
position.1 Thus, before a court either raises judicial estoppel on
209. See Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1982).
210. See supra notes 91-105 and accompanying text.
211. See American Nat'l Bank v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 710 F.2d 1528, 1536
(11th Cir. 1983) ("Judicial estoppel is applied to the calculated assertion of divergent
sworn positions."); Johnson Serv. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 164, 175
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its own motion or accepts a litigant's motion for dismissal on judi-
cial estoppel grounds, the court must ensure that the party is truly
attempting to persuade the court to accept two inconsistent posi-
tions. This prong of the test would prevent innocent litigants from
suffering the Draconian results of judicial estoppel, yet would still
protect the integrity of the courts from unscrupulous litigants who
attempt to abuse the judicial process through intentional self- con-
tradiction.
4. The balancing test
Even if a case meets the first three prongs of the judicial es-
toppel test-actually litigated, existence of an unequivocally clear
adoption of the prior position, and if the litigant's self-contra-
diction has reached the level of playing fast and loose with the
court-the judge must then balance the policies behind judicial es-
toppel against the harsh results suffered if judicial estoppel is in-
voked.212 Therefore, judges must use discretion in applying a bal-
ancing test to decide if an important right or superseding policy
would be trumped if judicial estoppel were applied. Like the
Morris court, judges should be able to decide that some rights or
interests are more important than the procedural device of judicial
estoppel-despite the very important policy considerations behind
the doctrine.
Factors that judges should consider when balancing the poli-
cies behind judicial estoppel versus the results that would occur
when it is invoked include: the importance of the right that would
be lost if judicial estoppel were invoked; the significance of the
position in the prior litigation, reliance, fairness, bad faith; actual
damages suffered by the court, the litigant, and the opposing party;
the fear of double recovery or unjust enrichment; and overall con-
siderations of justice.
These factors aid judges in the determination that even though
the elements of the classic case of judicial estoppel are met, the
doctrine should be superseded for reasons of greater policy impor-
tance.
(5th Cir. 1973) ("the rule looks toward cold manipulation and not an unthinking or
confused blunder"); Scarano v. Central R.R., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953)
("ITihis is more than affront to judicial dignity.... intentional self-contradiction is
being used as a means of obtaining unfair advantage in a forum provided for suitors
seeking justice.").
212. See supra notes 182-90 and accompanying text.
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B. Exceptions
Judicial estoppel must have a fraud, duress, or mistake excep-
tion in order to ensure that the doctrine will only be invoked
where its policies will be furthered. The reason for these excep-
tions is that "[b]ecause the rule [judicial estoppel] looks toward
cold manipulation and not an unthinking or confused blunder, it
has never been applied where plaintiff's assertions were based on
fraud, inadvertence, or mistake. 2 13 It would be inequitable and
unfair to hold a person to a position based upon fraud, duress, or
mistake. Furthermore, there would be no possibility of inconsis-
tent results or unscrupulous litigants taking advantage of the court
if the previous position became incorrect based upon an erroneous
assumption. Thus, the core policies behind judicial estoppel would
not be met if the doctrine were applied in the situation where one
of the exceptions should apply. A later change in circumstances
would also be acceptable to avoid judicial estoppel because the
position would no longer be inconsistent.
C. The Sua Sponte Ambush Factor
If a court is going to make a judicial estoppel motion sua
sponte, the court should give litigants "reasonable time" to file a
reply brief to the spontaneous application of judicial estoppel. The
reason for this extra time is that few people know about the doc-
trine and its elements, as well as possible exceptions such as an
overriding policy as set forth in Morris. 214 Until the doctrine and
its permutations are better known, it is unfair to saddle a litigant
with such a motion sua sponte, unless reasonable time is given to
research and reply to the motion or show cause why the court
should not apply the doctrine.
In summation, the recommended test for judicial estoppel
consists of these elements:
1. The area was actually litigated.
2. There was a full and fair opportunity for the litigant to as-
sert a factual position, and it is unequivocally clear that this posi-
tion was adopted by the first court.
3. The later inconsistent position must reach the level of
playing fast and loose with the court so as to be an intentional self-
contradiction.
213. Johnson, 485 F.2d at 175.
214. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
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4. The policy interests of judicial estoppel must be balanced
against the impact from the application of judicial estoppel, keep-
ing in mind the importance of the right or claim at issue.
a. There is a fraud, duress, mistake, or change of circum-
stances exception.
b. If raised sua sponte, litigants should be given a reasonable
time to reply.
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Appendix
Presently there is a four way split in the federal circuits on the
question of judicial estoppel-majority position, minority position,
acceptance without clearly defined elements, and outright rejec-
tion. Thus, if a case in which judicial estoppel is at issue should
reach the United States Supreme Court, it would be the Court's
constitutional duty to decide whether the federal courts should ac-
cept judicial estoppel, how the Erie doctrine affects judicial estop-
pel, and what the elements of judicial estoppel should be. Should
the Supreme Court ever be placed in the position to decide, seri-
ous consideration should be given to the recommended test pro-
posed in this Comment. The following chart describes the posi-
tions of the United States Supreme Court and the federal circuits'
accepted definitions of the judicial estoppel doctrine.
FEDERAL COURTS AND JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
Court Accept JE Form
U.S. Supreme Undecided Undecided
D.C. Circuit1  No
1st Circuit216  Yes Minority
2nd Circuit2 7  Yes Majority
3rd Circuit2 8  No
4th Circuit219  Yes Majority
5th Circuite,  Yes Majority
6th Circuit7' Yes Majority
7th Circuit" Yes Majority
215. Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
216. Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208 (1st Cir. 1987).
217. Bates v. Long Island R.R., 997 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1993).
218. Scarano v. Central R.R., 203 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1953).
219. Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162 (4th Cir. 1982).
220. City of Miami Beach v. Smith, 551 F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1977).
221. Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982).
222. DeGuiseppe v. Village of Bellwood, 68 F.3d 187 (7th Cir. 1995).
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Court
8th Circuit2
9th Circuit 24
10th Circuit
11th Circuite
Accept JE
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Form
Majority
Undecided
Majority
223. Wyldes v. Hundley, 69 F.3d 247 (8th Cir. 1995).
224. Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1991).
225. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir.
1991).
226. McKinnon v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 935 F.2d 1187 (11th Cir. 1991).
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